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I learned long ago, never to wrestle with a pig. 
You get dirty, and besides, the pig likes it. 
 
 George Bernard Shaw 
  
  
  
ABSTRACT 
The natural reservoir for influenza A viruses is birds, and numerous outbreaks of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza viruses have been documented. There is a risk of novel subtypes 
originating from birds infecting humans, and the question of migratory birds as long-distance 
vectors for highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses has also been raised. Areas where 
migratory flyways meet and birds nest have been suggested as hot spots for influenza A viruses 
to mix. In our study we found no evidence of recent genetic mixing at Point Barrow in Alaska. 
In order to know which subtypes currently circulate, influenza surveillance in domestic and 
wild birds is crucial. Detection of viral RNA from bird faeces is commonly used. However, 
detection of antibodies against influenza A virus provides useful information after birds have 
ceased to shed virus. We evaluated a pseudoparticle neutralization test, based on highly 
pathogenic avian influenza virus hemagglutinin. Our results show that the test can be used for 
detection of H5 and H7 specific antibodies, which offers an alternative to using standard 
neutralization tests where live virus is required.  
 
Influenza virus with new genetic material from birds has caused several human pandemics 
during the 20th century. In 2009,  the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus emerged. The receptor binding 
structure of the virus, the hemagglutinin, was phylogenetically closely related to the virus of 
the 1918 Spanish influenza. During the 2009 pandemic the elderly population was only mildly 
affected, possibly due to pre-existing cross-reactive neutralizing antibodies. Using a 
pseudoparticle neutralization assay we were able to investigate neutralizing antibody cross-
reactivity patterns in different age groups against H1 influenza viruses from 1918, 1934, 1999, 
and 2007. A significant difference between age groups in antibody titers against the 1918 and 
1934 viruses was observed. Individuals over the age of 90 had the highest levels of neutralizing 
antibodies against the 1918 virus, while those aged 71-90 had the highest levels against the 
1934 strain. The 1918 virus is antigenically similar to the 2009 virus and antibodies against the 
1918 virus may have protected against the 2009 virus. We also tested the sera for presence of 
neuraminidase inhibiting (NI) antibodies against the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. The results 
revealed a strong correlation between NI antibodies and age. NI antibodies did, however, not 
appear to significantly influence the neutralizing titers in a long-incubation neutralization 
assay. Antibodies targeting the neuraminidase may prevent severe illness and could together 
with pre-existing cross-reactive neutralizing antibodies have contributed to the mild outcome 
in the elderly during the 2009 pandemic. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Influenza A virus (IAV) causes significant human illness and death each year. The fact that 
around one billion cases of seasonal influenza occur each year is concerning, and it is also a 
burden for society from an economic perspective. A pandemic is an epidemic of an infectious 
disease that spreads across several continents. During the 20th century at least three severe 
pandemics have been caused by influenza viruses. It is evident from the annual epidemics and 
several pandemics that influenza is among the most serious infectious threats to humans. In the 
past, we have been ill-prepared for pandemics that strike fast and without warning.  
 
Birds are the natural hosts of influenza viruses. The pandemic influenza viruses have avoided 
the pre-existing influenza immunity by the introduction of new surface molecules from bird 
viruses. Since the detection and continued reports of human cases of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) in 1997 [1,2], the interest for research that focus on influenza as 
part of an ecosystem has dramatically increased. Research and surveillance increase our 
chances to be prepared when the next influenza pandemic strikes. The 2009 pandemic was the 
first pandemic where we could fully utilize the benefits of molecular techniques and instant 
information, and it was a first trial of a well-organized prevention and control of influenza 
pandemics.  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Influenza virus is an enveloped ribonucleic acid (RNA) virus belonging to the 
Orthomyxoviridae family. Influenzavirus A is a genus within this family, together with four 
other generas; Influenzavirus B, Influenzavirus C, Isavirus, and Thogotovirus. Influenza B virus 
is epidemiologically important and has been found primarily in humans, and influenza C virus 
only cause a mild and rarely diagnosed disease in humans and pigs [3,4]. Isavirus causes 
disease in fish [5] and Thogotovirus has been shown to infect both animals and humans [6]. 
Only IAV will be further discussed in this thesis. 
 
The first mammalian IAV strain was isolated from swine in 1931 [7]. In 1933, a human strain 
was isolated in the laboratory of Wilson Smith [8]. Throat-washings from patients with 
influenza symptoms were filtered and administered to different animal species. The ferret was 
the only animal that became infected. On the third day after inoculation, the ferrets became ill 
with catarrhal signs and a fever [8]. This was the first isolation of human IAV, although the 
disease was recognized and documented hundreds of years before. It is difficult to know when 
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the IAV was first introduced into humans but there are epidemics in the past that are believed 
to have been influenza outbreaks. One of the first pandemics clearly verified by epidemiology 
was the Russian Flu in 1889-1892 [9], and since then data have been more reliable. After 1933, 
when viruses were available for analysis, the existence of pandemics is not questioned.  
 
It is widely accepted that influenza is an infection originating from aquatic birds [10,11]. In 
their natural bird reservoir, the viruses mainly cause enteric infections with no clinical signs 
[12]. Classification of IAV is based on two surface glycoproteins, hemagglutinin (HA) and 
neuraminidase (NA) [13]. To date, there are 16 well characterized types of HA and nine types 
of NA [10,14-17], yielding a theoretical possibility of 144 unique combinations [17]. The 
majority of these combinations have been found in birds [18], and all 16 HA subtypes can 
replicate in domestic ducks and/or quail [19,20]. Recently, a 17th and 18th HA and a 10th and 
11th NA combined into H17N10 and H18N11 were discovered, but these two new subtypes 
have so far only been found in bats [21,22]. 
 
It is likely that the use of an intermediate host, such as swine, facilitates the adaptation of viruses 
to other mammalian hosts, including man. Only IAV, and to the present only subtypes H1N1, 
H2N2, and H3N2, has been identified as causes of pandemics in humans, but the identity of 
viruses causing pandemics before 1918 is unknown. Although other IAV subtypes such as 
H5N1, H7N2, H7N3, H7N7, H7N9, H9N2,  H10N7, and H10N8 have been shown to infect 
humans occasionally, there is no evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission [23]. Of 
16 HA and nine NA subtypes there are 13 HA and seven NA subtypes of IAV that the majority 
of the world’s population is immunologically naïve to. 
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1.1.1 Classification and nomenclature 
The nomenclature system that is in use for influenza virus strains include type of influenza (A, 
B, or C), geographic location of isolation, strain number, and year of isolation. If the virus is 
isolated from a different species than human, this is specified between type of influenza and 
geographic location. The HA and NA subtypes are specified last within parentheses. Examples: 
A/South Carolina/1/18 (H1N1) and A/Mallard/Sweden/7206/2004 (H7N7).  
 
1.1.2 Influenza A virus structure and function 
The shape of IAV can vary, but it is roughly spherical (although somewhat pleomorphic) or 
filamentous. The spherical virion is 80-120 nm in diameter, but the filamentous forms are often 
more than 300 nm in length. The genome consists of single stranded negative sense RNA 
divided into eight segments of various lengths that together code for a minimum of 10 proteins. 
The segments are numbered (1-8) in order of decreasing length (Table 1). Segments 4 and 6 
encode two surface glycoproteins, HA and NA, which project out like spikes from the virion 
envelope (Figure 1).  
 
The virion (Figure 1) is made up by the interior matrix protein M1 and the nucleocapsid, which 
consists of viral RNA (vRNA) and nucleoprotein (NP). Three segments (1, 2, and 3) encode 
for the polymerase subunits PB2, PB1, and PA. Together they form a heterotrimeric RNA-
dependent RNA polymerase found in the viral ribonucleoprotein (vRNP) complex. The 
envelope surrounding the nucleocapsid is derived from the host cell, and it contains the virus 
encoded transmembrane matrix protein M2, that in a tetrameric fashion forms an ion-channel. 
The NA is found as a tetramer, and HA as a trimer. HA is about four to five times more 
abundant than NA, but the ratio varies from strain to strain [24]. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
  
 
 
 
Table 1. Influenza A virus segments, gene products, and their function   
Segment Length (bp) Protein Main function 
1 2341 PB2 Polymerase subunit, binds the 5’ cap-1 structure of 
host pre-mRNA 
 
2 2341 PB1 
 
N40 
PB1-F2 
 
Polymerase subunit, responsible for elongation in 
template RNA and vRNA synthesis 
Unknown function 
Pro-apoptotic, virulence factor 
3 2233 PA 
PA-X 
Polymerase subunit, endonuclease activity 
Modulates the host immune responses 
 
4 1778 HA Surface glycoprotein, receptor binding and membrane 
fusion 
 
5 1565 NP Binds to and encapsidates vRNA 
 
6 1413 NA Surface glycoprotein, prevents aggregation by 
cleaving terminal sialic acid from glycoproteins and 
glycolipids 
 
7 1027 M1 
 
M2 
Matrix protein, forms a shell underneath the virion 
envelope 
Ion channel protein, uncoating of virus and control of 
pH in Golgi  
 
8 890 NS1 
 
NS2/NEP 
Nonstructural protein, interferon antagonist and post-
transcriptional modulation 
Nonstructural protein, nuclear export protein, 
mediates nuclear export of vRNA 
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Figure 1. Influenza A virion. Embedded in the viral envelope are the two surface proteins, HA 
and NA, and the transmembrane M2 ion-channel. The negative single-stranded RNA segments 
together with NP and the polymerase complex (PA, PB1, and PB2) form the vRNP complex. 
M1 is associated with both the envelope and the vRNP.   
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1.1.3 Virus life cycle 
1.1.3.1 Entry  
When the HA protein of IAV attaches to its designated sialic acid (SA) receptor, the dynamic 
process of replication begins (Figure 2). IAV recognizes oligosaccharides containing a terminal 
SA. Different SA receptors and the affinity of different HAs to them have a critical role in 
determining species specificity, zoonoses transmission, and pathogenesis, as well as pandemic 
behavior of influenza virus strains. Human IAV bind with stronger affinity to α2,6-linked SA 
which predominate in the human upper respiratory tract [25], while avian IAV preferentially 
binds to α2,3-linked SA which is present on epithelial cells in the intestine of birds [26]. This 
is one of the barriers for transmission between birds and humans, although in the lower part of 
the human respiratory tract both of these receptors can be found [27].  
 
Endocytosis is initiated after binding of ligand to receptor (Figure 2) [28,29]. Here, HA plays 
a critical role. The uncoating of the virus is a process where two criteria must be fulfilled: the 
HA must be cleaved into HA1 and HA2 by a protease [30,31] and the pH must be lowered to 
~5. Low pH triggers an irreversible conformational change in the cleaved HA that allows the 
virion membrane to fuse with the endosomal membrane (Figure 2). The M1-vRNP interactions 
are interrupted, leading to the release of the vRNPs into the cytoplasm. The vRNP complexes 
are then transported into the host cell nucleus for transcription [32].  
 
1.1.3.2 Transcription 
Once inside the host cell nucleus, vRNA is transcribed to messenger RNA (mRNA) (Figure 2). 
The heterotrimeric RNA-dependent RNA-polymerase complex consists of subunit PB1, PB2, 
and PA [33-37] and catalyzes RNA polymerization, polyadenylation of mRNA, and cleavage 
of host mRNAs to generate capped RNA fragments. IAV uses a “cap-snatching” mechanism, 
meaning that transcription is initiated with an RNA primer that is excised from cellular mRNA 
[38,39]. For IAV, the genomic vRNA is initially transcribed to complementary RNA and 
thereafter complementary RNA is transcribed to vRNA.  
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1.1.3.3 Translation, assembly, and budding 
The host cell translation machinery translates IAV mRNA to proteins in the cytoplasm (Figure 
2). The newly synthesized viral polymerase subunits and NP are imported into the nucleus 
where they assemble with newly transcribed vRNAs [40,41]. Export of vRNPs into the 
cytoplasm is mediated by the viral NEP/NS2 and M1 proteins. Newly synthesized HA, NA, 
and M2 proteins enter the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) where they are post-translationally 
processed [42-45]. Recent studies have identified human serine proteases located in the human 
airways to be involved in cleaving of HA into HA1 and HA2. Human airway trypsin-like 
(HAT) protease and transmembrane protease serine S1 member 2 (TMPRSS2) both cleave HA 
proteins containing a single arginine at the cleavage site [46]. HAT has been shown to cleave 
newly synthesized HA before or during the release of newly produced viruses as well as the 
HA of incoming viruses. TMPRSS2 cleaves HA that is present within the cell, and cannot 
support the proteolytic activation of HA of incoming viruses [47]. The HA of HPAI virus 
contains a polybasic cleavage site and is processed in the trans-Golgi network, most likely by 
cellular furin-like proteases [48]. The cleavage of HA is critical for the virulence of IAV.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Replication cycle of IAV. The virus enters the cell through receptor-mediated 
endocytosis. After the viral envelope fuses with the endosome, vRNP complexes are released 
into the cytoplasm and subsequently transported to the nucleus where replication and 
transcription take place. The new virions are assembled at, and buds off, the host cell plasma 
membrane. 
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The folded and processed proteins and vRNPs are then transported to the cell membrane for 
virus particle formation and budding (Figure 2). The different vRNPs are thought to have 
specific inter-vRNP interactions to maintain a conformation that results in eight different 
vRNPs being packed into an influenza particle [49,50]. Recent research suggests that the 
vRNPs are held together by direct base-pairing between packaging signals present in the 
vRNAs [51]. The virus buds from lipid rafts in the plasma membrane. The NA protein is 
responsible for removing SA from both the host cell membrane and from viral glycoproteins, 
thereby preventing virion aggregation [52-54].  
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1.2 EVOLUTION AND ECOLOGY 
1.2.1 Antigenic drift and shift 
The IAV strategy for survival is to efficiently evade the immune system. After infection, viral 
load usually peak within 48-72 hours [55]. The peak coincides with the time for the first wave 
of specific antibodies. At this point, transmission to the next susceptible host has already 
occurred, ensuring the survival of the virus. Eventually, however, the majority of the population 
will have developed HA specific antibodies, and transmission among others than very young 
children will end. However,  IAV uses two evasion strategies, the first being antigenic drift 
(Figure 3). The RNA-dependent RNA polymerase lacks proofreading mechanisms, thus 
allowing for mutations during transcription at a rate of approximately 1.5x10-5 mutations per 
nucleotide per infectious cycle [10,56]. Due to the high selective pressure on HA and NA, new 
variants that can evade neutralizing antibodies and replication inhibiting antibodies are favored. 
The influenza  HA remains surprisingly functional despite profound antigenic changes. This is 
the explanation to long term persistence of a virus subtype and the reason why annual influenza 
epidemics occur. It is not due to a lack of immunity from infection or vaccination. Analyses of 
strains isolated from the natural reservoir of IAV, birds, have revealed that antigenic drift does 
not occur to the same extent in birds [10]. Instead, the strains existing in wild birds appear to 
be in evolutionary stasis. Sequences obtained from birds captured more than 80 years apart 
have been shown to be very similar [57]. 
 
The second evasion strategy is called antigenic shift (Figure 3), involving instant major 
antigenic changes in the IAV genetic material. To cross species barriers, the virus needs to 
either accumulate changes that make adaption to new host cells possible, or gain changes 
through gene segment reassortment. Antigenic shift requires that one cell is co-infected with 
multiple influenza subtypes. The reassortment can result in the creation of a novel combination 
of HA and sometimes NA, and such an event poses a pandemic threat if the subtype is naïve to 
the population. A common example of a “mixing vessel” is the pig, a species that can be 
infected with avian IAV as well as human IAV. As described, most avian and human IAV 
preferentially bind to specific receptor types, α2,3-linked SA (avian) or α2,6-linked SA 
(human) [58]. In the trachea of pigs, both these receptors are present [59], making it an ideal 
“mixing vessel”. If genetic material from both human and avian viruses were mixed, resulting 
in a novel subtype that has retained its ability of human to human transmission, the virus would 
have pandemic potential. Pigs are not the only possible “mixing vessel”, there is also a risk that 
the same thing can happen in humans, as IAVs circulating in bird populations can infect 
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humans. An antigenic shift is devastating since it leaves the pre-existing antibodies and T cells 
ineffective. Antigenic drift and shift are what enables the virus to efficiently evade antibody 
mediated immune responses at population level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Antigenic shift and drift. The virus can change antigenically in two ways. Either 
existing antigens are subtly altered, called antigenic drift, or two or more virus strains in the 
same host may give rise to antigenically shifted progeny virus, where one (or several) 
segment/s is/are replaced by a segment/s from another strain. The two glycoproteins, HA and 
NA, as well as the internal gene segments are subject to antigenic shift.   
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1.2.2 Persistence and modes of transmission 
The incidence of influenza in birds exhibits strong seasonal fluctuations and raises questions 
concerning where the virus is perpetuated between outbreaks. Both biotic and abiotic reservoirs 
may provide an explanation to the seasonality of avian IAV. A biotic reservoir is constituted 
by living organisms, such as animals. An abiotic reservoir can be a part of an ecosystem, for 
example soil, water, or air. The IAV is unable to replicate outside a host cell, and in order to 
infect new individuals it needs to persist for some time in the environment. IAV is quite well 
adapted to persist in an aqueous environment, and factors such as temperature, humidity, pH, 
and salinity have been shown to influence the persistence of the virus. IAV stored at 28°C in 
distilled water could remain infective for up to 100 days, at 17°C virus was infective after 200 
days, and at 4°C virus could remain infective for much longer [60]. It has also been shown that 
virus infectivity decreases with higher salt content in water [61]. Optimal conditions for virus 
survival are not common in nature, considering additional factors that may limit virus 
persistence; pH fluctuations, UV-radiation, the presence of degrading enzymes, bacteria, and 
other microorganisms. One difference between human IAV and avian IAV is tolerance to low 
pH. In contrast to human viruses avian IAV strains can persist and remain active at pH 4.0 [62].  
 
Avian IAV circulates in wild bird populations and infected birds shed high titers of virus, both 
orally and in feces, for several days [12,63]. Infected waterfowl swimming in the same pond 
or lake as uninfected birds can transmit the virus via feces excreted in the water [64,65]. 
Excreted virus can persist for long periods of time in water. One study show that virus could 
be detected after 32 days at 4°C [62]. There is evidence of IAV RNA in frozen lake water even 
after nesting birds have migrated south [66], and in lakes in Alaska, IAV RNA was found in 
lake sediment [67]. Further analysis of that RNA revealed a diversity of virus subtypes 
including a subtype that had not been found from sampled birds the same year [67]. It supports 
the theory that IAV can persist and reappear after a long period of time, however, infective 
virus in sediments has not yet been demonstrated.  
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1.3 INFLUENZA A VIRUS IN DIFFERENT HOSTS 
1.3.1 Wild and domestic birds 
The idea that all IAV strains originate from wild birds is widely accepted (Figure 4) [10]. 
Subtypes H1-H16 and N1-N9 have been detected in virus isolates from avian species. Most 
avian viruses are low pathogenic in poultry, although H5 and H7 IAV have the potential to 
become highly pathogenic. Disease caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus 
is characterized by severe illness and rapid death [68]. The main difference between a low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus and an HPAI virus is the HA cleavage site, which in 
HPAI virus has become a polybasic cleavage site. The elongated cleavage site can be cleaved 
intracellularly by ubiquitous proteases, which facilitates systemic virus replication in infected 
birds [69]. 
 
 
Figure 4. Host range of IAV. The natural reservoir in the middle, and other animals in which 
IAV have been found. Two HA subtypes, H17 and H18, have been found in bats only 
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Avian IAV has been isolated from more than 100 avian species [70]. Waterfowl, shorebirds, 
and gulls are more commonly infected than other wild bird species. The introduction of high-
throughput molecular diagnostic methods have led to increased surveillance [71]. Several 
studies of wild ducks in the Northern hemisphere have revealed a high prevalence of IAV, with 
a peak in early fall [10,72]. During spring-migration the prevalence is much lower, around 1% 
[10], although some report prevalence of up to 6,5% [73]. Surveillance of birds at breeding 
grounds in Alaska and Siberia show an IAV prevalence of 0,03% in the summer [74]. These 
prevalence patterns raise the possibility that IAV can persist in ducks all year round. The pattern 
observed corresponds with the immunological status of ducks. When a large proportion of 
immunologically naïve hatch-year individuals are recruited to the population, a peak of IAV 
can be observed [72,75,76]. The IAV prevalence in ducks increases at pre-migratory 
gatherings, and subsequently drops during winter. The drop in prevalence is probably because 
most individuals have been infected and developed an immune response to IAV [77]. It has 
been shown that experimental infection of mallards with LPAI virus protects against 
subsequent challenge with the same virus [12]. Moreover, mallards that were infected with 
LPAI H5 or H4 virus developed immunity that led to reduced viral shedding after challenge 
with HPAI H5 virus [78]. At Ottenby bird observatory, located on Öland, Sweden, research 
has been conducted since the 1940s. A recent publication [79] revealed that since 2002, 74 
different combinations of IAV have been found in mallards. All N1-N9 subtypes were 
identified, and almost all HA subtypes (H1-H12). Some combinations were more frequently 
observed than others, and LPAI virus of subtypes H5N1 and H7N9 were only found once [79].  
 
In domestic ducks, IAV can be isolated year round. Several factors favor the maintenance of 
IAV in domestic birds. The virus can remain infective in lake water [64], and for that reason 
ponds and rice fields are ideal for effectively transmitting the virus via the fecal-oral route [80]. 
Many duck farms in China are located near lakes which may provide opportunities for IAV 
exchange among ducks from different populations and between domestic and migratory birds. 
Ducks can shed virus for several weeks [12,63] and viruses can persist in  the population if 
birds of different ages, with different immunological statuses, when maintained in the same 
farm [80]. However, only a few subtypes are known to persist in poultry. The endemic strains 
H6N1 and H9N2 cause mild clinical signs in poultry [80]. Moreover, these viruses have 
changed their replication site from the intestine to the trachea, which may change the 
transmission from the fecal-oral route to aerosol [80]. There are studies suggesting that 
interspecies transmission to humans is not rare in endemic regions [81,82]. 
 
 14 
So far only HA subtypes H5 and H7 have been found in the highly pathogenic form. LPAI 
virus of these subtypes may evolve to HPAI virus when introduced into poultry. Outbreaks of 
HPAI caused by H5N1 virus have been frequently reported from several countries since the 
1990s, and numerous genotypes of H5N1 have been detected [83]. 
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1.3.2 Humans 
Epidemics of IAV in humans occur every year, both in the Northern and the Southern 
hemisphere. The epidemics occur during the winter season, roughly October to April in the 
Northern hemisphere, and May to September in the Southern hemisphere. In tropical regions, 
IAV can circulate for much longer. Of all respiratory illnesses, influenza has the most dramatic 
effect on communities.  
 
Influenza is an ancient disease, most likely first described in 412 BC. Historically, there are 
many records of outbreaks that may have been caused by influenza virus. The outbreaks have 
occurred at irregular intervals and varied in severity. The pandemic in 1830-1833 began in the 
winter of 1830 in China, and from there it spread to the Philippines, India, Indonesia, and across 
Russia into Europe. The pandemic reached Sweden in May 1831 [84]. The pandemic was 
characterized by a high attack rate but the case mortality rates were low [85]. Thereafter the 
influenza outbreaks seem to have been scarce until 1889.  
 
The first well-documented pandemic was the Russian flu pandemic of 1889-1893 (Figure 5). 
Seroarcheological research has suggested that this pandemic was caused by an IAV of subtype 
H3N8 [86,87]. It has also been speculated that the virus that caused the Russian flu was an H2 
subtype and that the H3 subtype emerged somewhere around year 1900 [86,88]. Later in the 
20th century, when H3N2 IAV caused the Hong Kong pandemic in 1968, the low mortality 
observed in individuals of age 70 or older indicated that the IAV strain of their childhood may 
have been subtype H3 [89,90]. The Russian flu pandemic appeares to have started in the spring 
in Russia and it was confined to that area until late summer and from October, it emerged 
globally in repeated waves.  
 
It has been suggested that this particular H3N8 strain continued to circulate until 1918, when 
the H1N1 Spanish flu emerged. However, seroarcheological data suggests that only half of 
those born in 1893 were primed with H3 [90], and among individuals born after 1900 H3 
antibodies were rare or absent [86]. This indicates that another subtype was circulating prior to 
the 1918 pandemic. Although there is no clear evidence that H1 emerged around 1900, there 
are indications of prior adaptation of the H1 HA from the Spanish flu to humans before 1918 
[87].  
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Figure 5. Major influenza A pandemics. Several pandemics have occurred during the past 
century. The Spanish flu in 1918 caused an estimated 50 millions deaths. The three pandemics 
that followed were relatively mild compared to the Spanish flu. Length of arrows show how 
long the subtype circulated in the human population. 
 
 
In March 1918, several severe cases of influenza were reported in the United States (Figure 5). 
The virus spread throughout the United States, Europe, and probably Asia. During this first 
wave of the Spanish flu, mortality rates were in the normal range. However, when the second 
wave came in the fall of 1918, the mortality rates had increased dramatically. The third wave 
came in the winter of 1918-1919 and it has been estimated that 30% of the population in the 
world were clinically affected by the 1918 pandemic [91]. Globally, it is thought to have killed 
up to 50 million people, unexpectedly targeting young adults. Influenza and pneumonia death 
rates were 20 times higher in 1918 compared to the previous year [91]. Most deaths were 
caused by secondary bacterial pneumonia, but the 1918 virus could also kill quickly and 
directly with a viral pneumonia [91]. During the second and third wave, there was a case-
fatality rate of 1-2% in 20-39 year-olds, which is an age group not usually severely affected by 
influenza.  
 
With modern technology, the genome of the causative agent of the Spanish flu has been 
sequenced [92,93]. The material used was formalin-fixed, paraffin-embedded autopsy tissues 
from an American soldier and tissue from an Alaskan Inuit woman who had been buried in 
permafrost [92,93].  The successful re-creation of the Spanish flu H1N1 virus has enabled 
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researchers to further study the genetic composition of this virus. Seven of the eight gene 
segments of the Spanish flu show signs of avian origin. Usually, the uracil content increases 
after transmission to mammals. The seven segments exhibit avian-like uracil content, while the 
segment encoding for the HA shows signs of being introduced to humans earlier [87,94]. 
 
The next pandemic occurred in 1957 and is called the Asian flu (Figure 5). It started with a 
major outbreak in Hong Kong. Three of the gene segments, HA, NA, and PB1, from an avian 
IAV had combined with the previously circulating A(H1N1) strain [95]. The antigenically 
shifted virus, now of subtype H2N2, spread throughout the world. It started in central China 
and spread worldwide. It is estimated that the pandemic affected 40-50% of people, of which 
25-30% experienced clinical illness [88]. The viral seed needed to develop a vaccine was ready 
in early May, and about six months later a vaccine was available for use [96]. 
 
Eleven years later, in 1968, the Hong Kong flu caused a pandemic originating in China (Figure 
5). The subtype was determined as an H3N2 IAV, this time a reassortant with HA and PB1 
from an avian source [95]. The virus that caused the Hong Kong pandemic was substantially 
less pathogenic compared to its predecessors, which partly may be because the NA of the virus 
remained the same as for the previously circulating virus.  
 
In 1976, there was an episode of swine influenza outbreaks among military recruits in the 
United States. The causative agent was identified as an A(H1N1) virus of swine origin. It was 
thought to be the beginning of a new pandemic and vaccine production was started. The virus 
never returned, and there have been other reports of abortive spread of swine viruses in humans 
since this episode. The year after, in 1977, the H1N1 virus re-emerged. In an outbreak in 
Siberia, the causative agent was identified. However, it is known that the virus circulated in 
China prior to the Siberian outbreak [97]. The virus was similar to H1N1 viruses circulating in 
1950 [98], and it rarely affected individuals > 25 years of age [99]. Outbreaks of mainly mild 
influenza occurred in younger individuals. The reintroduction of H1N1 did not result in the 
disappearance of the H3N2. After this, influenza vaccines were made trivalent, containing both 
IAV subtypes H3N2 and H1N1 as well as influenza B.   
 
Influenza pandemics are expected to occur at irregular intervals. The 1957 and 1968 pandemics 
took place 11 years apart, so the outbreak in 1977, 11 years after the 1968 pandemic, was 
alarming. In the years after the 1977 outbreak it was feared that a pandemic was imminent. 
After 1997, much effort was made to ensure that the outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 were under 
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control, but no one suspected that the next pandemic would be caused by a subtype that had 
already circulated in the population (Figure 5). Starting in Mexico, several countries across the 
globe began to report laboratory confirmed cases of a novel H1N1 IAV to the World Health 
Organization (WHO). On April 25th 2009, the WHO declared a public health emergency of 
international concern. In June 2009, 73 countries had reported more than 26 000 laboratory 
confirmed cases and the WHO declared that the pandemic had reached phase 6. This phase is 
characterized by community level outbreaks in at least two countries in one WHO region plus 
one country in a different WHO region [100]. During the course of the 2009 pandemic, 
mortality among children, young adults, and pregnant women was higher compared to seasonal 
epidemics. Generally, elderly fared relatively well since few were infected, but the lethality 
among the few elderly was high in comparison to other groups. Data from 19 countries was 
analyzed for prepandemic seroprevalence, and these results showed the highest rates of cross-
reactive prepandemic antibodies in persons >65 years [101]. However, this was not found in 
all studies. In Sweden the prevalence of pre-existing cross-reactive antibodies in individuals 
>65 years of age was not significantly higher than in other age groups [102] but the same 
disease pattern, that elderly were relatively spared, was observed. In typical epidemics, 90% of 
mortality occurs in this age group [103]. On august 10th 2010 the WHO declared that the H1N1 
influenza virus had moved into the post-pandemic period. 
 
Apart from the pandemics and seasonal epidemics of influenza, there have been reports of 
spillover from the natural reservoir. In 1997, the first case of HPAI H5N1 virus in humans was 
reported [1]. Since then, H5N1 IAV has caused nearly 700 human cases, with a case-fatality 
rate of 60% [2]. There are also reports of H7 IAV causing disease in humans, with symptoms 
ranging from conjunctivitis to pneumonia to death [104]. Recently, the emergence of H7N9 
[105] has once again proven that influenza surveillance in birds is of utmost importance. This 
particular strain had neither been seen in animals nor in humans until march 2013 [106]. Since 
then, it has caused infections in both birds and humans. H7N9 is epidemic and considered low 
pathogenic in poultry, but most infected humans have become severely ill. So far no human-
to-human transmission indicating air-borne transmission has been observed. The H7N9 virus 
has gene segments from H9N2 [107], which has been shown to infect numerous avian and 
mammalian hosts [108]. Reports of H10N8 human cases have also been made [109]. It is 
evident that IAV from birds pose a threat to human health, and it is crucial to be on guard and 
prepared for the next pandemic.  
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1.3.3 Other mammals 
1.3.3.1 Swine 
As with human influenza, swine influenza can be detected year-round, although seasonal peaks 
occur in temperate regions. Typically it is a mild disease with clinical signs, including fever, 
cough, respiratory distress, nasal discharge, weakness and dyspnea. More severe clinical 
manifestations can occur in co-infections with other respiratory pathogens. In swine, viruses 
differ according to geographical regions, and new epidemic strains do not necessarily replace 
existing endemic strains. The classical swine H1N1 virus has been suggested to be derived 
from the 1918 human pandemic H1N1 virus, and there are reports from the 1918 period of 
humans and pigs developing respiratory illness simultaneously [99]. This suggests the 
establishment of H1N1 in North American swine around the same time as the 1918 pandemic. 
 
In 1998, outbreaks of swine respiratory disease revealed a triple reassortant H3N2 lineage, 
comprised of gene segments from classical swine influenza, human influenza and avian 
influenza. Since then, many different reassortants have been detected between triple reassortant 
swine IAV and classical swine [110,111], human H1N1 [112], human H3N2 [113], and avian 
H2N3 [114] lineages, respectively. Some reassortants have continued to circulate, and some 
have been transient. In Europe, classical swine IAV was not detected until 1976. Early variants 
of human H3N2 virus were detected in European and Asian swine, but it was not until 1979 
that another IAV lineage could be detected in European swine. This was an avian-like H1N1. 
There are further reports of avian virus strains in swine; more specifically subtypes H1N1, 
H3N3 [115] and H4N6 [116] which were isolated in Canadian swine. In the 1970s, classical 
swine H1N1 was isolated in South-East Asia. 
 
1.3.3.2 Horses 
One of the most common respiratory pathogen in horses is equine influenza virus. Throughout 
history, only Iceland and New Zealand have remained free from equine influenza. Two 
subtypes of equine influenza virus are recognized today: equine-1 (H7N7) and equine-2 
(H3N8). Both are believed to have originated from avian IAV ancestors [117], and an outbreak 
of H3N8 in horses in the Chinese provinces of Jilin and Heilonjiang showed that horses are 
susceptible to avian IAV [118].      
 
 20 
1.3.3.3 Felines 
Studies from the 70s have provided evidence that cats are susceptible to experimental infection 
with human IAV variants H2N2 and H3N2, as well as influenza B virus [119,120]. The animals 
shed virus for up to six days, and it was shown that virus inoculated cats could transmit virus 
to susceptible animals. Interspecies transmission has been observed from an infected human to 
a cat [119]. In South-East Asia, captive tigers and leopards became ill and died after feeding 
on H5N1 contaminated chicken carcasses [121] and it was shown that there was direct 
transmission from the contaminated food, and also probable transmission between tigers [122].  
When surveillance was increased due to the emergence of the 2009 pandemic virus, feline cases 
were identified [123]. These cases of infected domestic cats are likely due to transmission from 
infected humans. In sentinel-based studies of cats, seroconversions were detected [124], and 
the pattern seen in cats experimentally infected with the 2009 pandemic virus resembled a 
milder form of the H5N1 induced disease [125]. 
 
1.3.3.4 Canines 
In 2004, an IAV was isolated from a greyhound in Florida [126]. It was a unique lineage of 
H3N8, and all eight gene segments were of equine origin. Since then, cases of canine influenza 
have been reported from the US, from England, and Australia [127,128]. Along with the 
emergence of H5N1 in South-East Asia, it became evident that companion animals were 
susceptible to H5N1 infection [129]. In 2004, a dog in Thailand died after eating duck carcasses 
[129]. IAV was isolated from both lungs and extrapulmonary tissue, and genetic analyses 
revealed that it was essentially identical to the H5N1 virus infecting birds, tigers, and humans 
in Thailand. In a study in Thailand, antibodies to H5N1 were found in 160 out of 629 village 
dogs tested [130]. 
 
1.3.3.5 Minks & ferrets 
As a disease model, influenza in ferrets mimics human disease best. When infected, ferrets 
display clinical signs of disease such as sneezing and coughing, but also decreased appetite 
followed by weight loss, lethargy, and fever [8,131]. Natural infection in minks with subtype 
H10N4 has been detected in a Swedish outbreak [132]. Further investigation of this particular 
strain revealed a probable wild bird origin. The virus was similar to avian virus strains but was 
adapted to transmission between minks [133,134].  
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1.3.3.6 Seals & whales 
It is well established that seals and whales are susceptible to IAV [135-142]. The first virus to 
be isolated was H1N3 which was found in lung tissue from a South Pacific striped whale in 
1976 [135]. Subtypes H13N2 and H13N9 were isolated from a stranded pilot whale in 1984 
[138]. In seals, several subtypes have been found, H7N7 caused an outbreak of severe 
respiratory infection and high mortality in seals along the New England coast in 1979-1980 
[136]. In the same geographic area in 1983 there was another outbreak, this time IAV of 
subtype H4N5 [137]. Follow-up surveillance in this area resulted in the isolation of H4N6 and 
H3N3 viruses [139], and serological surveillance in Japan revealed exposure to HA subtypes 
H3 and H6 [141]. Genetic analysis showed that all genes from the isolated viruses were of 
avian origin [137,139]. Receptor specificity preferences of some of the isolates have been 
studied [140], and found to be avian-like in the aspect that they preferentially bind to α2,3-
linked sialic acid (SA). This type of SA is also found in the lungs of whales and seals. A recent 
study also reported that A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was isolated from Northern elephant seals, and 
that the strains were proven to have a greater than 99% homology to A/Calilfornia/04/2009 
(H1N1) [142]. The fact that IAV can cause disease in marine mammals, and that serological 
data indicate exposure of various subtypes, suggest that these types of infections occur 
sporadically.  
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1.4 INFLUENZA A IMMUNITY IN HUMANS 
Infection by IAV in humans is initiated in the respiratory tract, and the infection is generally 
contained in this organ. In the oral or nasal cavities, the virus encounters mucus that covers the 
respiratory epithelium. Next, it attaches to and infects the respiratory epithelial cells. The innate 
immune response is activated early in infection, followed by the adaptive immune response.  
 
1.4.1 The innate immune response 
The innate immune system, which is the first line of defense, provides a number of mechanisms 
that effectively reduces the burden of infection. Pattern recognition receptors (PRRs) recognize 
the viral RNA that is present in infected cells and initiates signaling cascades that lead to innate 
immune responses. There are at least three distinct classes of PRRs, i.e. Toll-like receptors 
(TLR3, TLR7 and TLR8), retinoic acid-inducible gene I (RIG-I) and a NOD-like receptor 
(NLRP3). The TLRs recognize dsRNA from virus-infected cells (TLR3) and ssRNA in 
endosomes of sentinel cells (TLR7/8) [143]. RIG-I detects ssRNA bearing 5’-triphosphates, 
and NRLP3 detects virus that is present in the cytosol of infected cells. Both TLRs and RIG-I 
induce interferon (IFN) production, while NRLP3 is involved in the secretion of interleukin-
1β and interleukin-18. They act to promote adaptive immune responses and prime natural killer 
cells and cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTLs) [144]. The secretion of type I IFN stimulates the 
expression of hundreds of IFN-stimulated genes in neighboring cells, thereby inducing them 
into an antiviral state. Interferon stimulated gene products act to limit IAV infection and spread 
by inhibiting replication and by degrading vRNA [144]. 
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1.4.2 The adaptive immune response 
The second line of defense against IAV infection is the adaptive immune response. This 
highly specific response is relatively slow when first encountered by a specific pathogen. 
However, with memory being the prominent feature of adaptive immunity, the response is 
fast and strong when encountered the second time.   
 
1.4.2.1 Cellular immune response 
The cellular immune response is activated after recognition of viral epitopes, presented on 
antigen presenting cells. CD4+ T cells differentiate to T helper cells, which in turn can promote 
the activation and differentiation of B cells. T helper cells are also involved in promoting 
cytotoxic T lymphocytes. CTLs are CD8+ T cells which have been activated after recognition 
of viral epitopes on antigen presenting cells. They migrate to the site of infection where they 
recognize and eliminate IAV infected cells [145]. CTLs are mainly directed against epitopes 
of the internal viral proteins [146]. Hence, they display a high degree of cross-reactivity with 
IAV of different subtypes. After infection, a memory T cell pool persists and can undergo rapid 
reactivation after reinfection.  
The main way in which IAV can evade recognition by CTLs is through the high mutation rate 
during replication. For example, there are more non-synonymous mutations in CTL epitope 
regions compared to the rest of the protein [147].   
 
1.4.2.2 Humoral immune response 
IAV infection induces production of specific antibodies by B cells. Primary infection induces 
IgM, IgA, and IgG isotypes, while IgM antibodies are not observed in reinfections [148]. The 
two surface glycoproteins of IAV, HA and NA, are excellent targets for B cell responses. The 
globular head of the HA is a major target of neutralizing antibodies. Most antibodies targeting 
the HA globular head are strain specific and cannot neutralize drift variants and viruses of other 
subtypes. It seems that IAV infection induces a long lasting antibody response. It has been 
suggested that exposure to A(H1N1) IAV strains that have been circulating in the past may 
have partially protected the elderly against the 2009 pandemic virus [149,150]. In addition to 
antibodies targeting the globular head and the receptor-binding pocket, antibodies targeting the 
stalk region of HA are also generated. This region is highly conserved, and antibodies binding 
the stalk region provide protection against various IAV strains [151,152]. Compared to HA 
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targeting antibodies, NA inhibiting (NI) antibodies have received less attention. However, they 
do play a crucial role in limiting the spread of newly formed viral particles. Antibodies that 
block the NA act like the body’s own NA inhibitor by effectively reducing the replication 
efficiency. Several studies have shown that NI antibodies are important for reduced viral 
replication and disease severity [153-155]. In one study from the 1970s, it was indicated that 
repeated exposure by natural infection was needed to induce anti-NA responses [156]. In 
addition, it has been indicated that protection against clinical disease during the Hong Kong 
A(H3N2) epidemic in 1968 was related to prepandemic NI antibodies [157].  
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1.4.3 Clinical features, pathogenesis, and transmission 
Human IAV is highly contagious and is transmitted by the airborn route. Cough, creating 
aerosols, is a major symptom of influenza and facilitates spread. Circulating human IAV strains 
mainly cause respiratory disease and preferably infect the epithelium lining the airways. The 
respiratory tract is the primary target of infection, not only for human IAV, but also for 
mammalian IAV in general. The virus does not normally spread beyond the respiratory tract. 
The protease needed to cleave and activate the HA is located in epithelial cells in the airways 
and lungs. As a result, free virus is rarely found circulating in the blood or in other organs. The 
incubation period is 1-5 days, with an average of 2 days. Virus replication peaks at 2-3 days 
after infection. Factors that determine the clinical course and outcome are virulence of the virus, 
age of the patient, and the presence of chronic illness, immunosuppression, or pregnancy. The 
characteristic clinical symptoms for influenza are an abrupt onset, with fever being the most 
prominent symptom. Other symptoms are headache, chills, dry cough, myalgia, malaise, and 
anorexia. Rhinorrhea, nasal congestion, and sore throat are present, although these symptoms 
are overshadowed by the systemic symptoms during the first 3 days of illness. Systemic 
symptoms are due to the body’s own immune system being activated and the release of 
proinflammatory cytokines [158]. Fever and upper respiratory tract symptoms usually resolve 
within 7-10 days. Cough and weakness may persist 1-2 weeks after onset.  
 
Differences in IAV virulence may cause a more severe disease. For example, the 1918 Spanish 
influenza virus was more virulent than viruses causing seasonal epidemics. Some mechanisms 
that determine pathogenicity are tropism, spread of infection, replication efficiency, and escape 
from or modulation of host immune response. The 1918 Spanish flu virus has, compared to the 
2009 pandemic virus, a higher virus yield in human airway cells. It binds stronger to the 
receptor, has a functional PBI-F2, and was often associated with secondary bacterial infections 
[103]. The influenza protein NS1 is involved in inhibiting RIG-I, by blocking downstream 
signaling and thereby attenuating IFN expression [159]. The tropism of avian and human 
viruses is restricted to the type of receptor. Avian viruses preferentially bind α2,3-linked SA 
receptors, and human viruses bind α2,6-linked SA receptors. However, in the human lower 
respiratory tract (in bronchiolar and alveolar tissue) both of these receptor types are present in 
equal amounts [27]. Avian viruses can therefore replicate in the lower respiratory tract, which 
increase their pathogenicity in humans. HPAI viruses have an elongated HA cleavage site, 
resulting in a virus with increased pathogenicity. 
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The primary mode of transmission of IAV is by aerosol or droplets. The IAV can also be 
transmitted by direct contact with virus-contaminated hands, or by fomites [160]. Several 
studies support the theory that IAV survival and transmission is facilitated by low relative and 
absolute humidity and low temperatures [161,162]. The number of influenza patients increase 
during the winter period. There are cases during the summer, but epidemic spread does not start 
until the temperature drops in autumn. The behavior of IAV enables vaccines to be produced 
and evaluated in time.  
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1.5 PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OPTIONS 
1.5.1 Vaccines 
Vaccination against influenza is an important way to control pandemics and seasonally 
occuring epidemics since the first inactivated influenza vaccine (IIV) was licensed in 1945 
[163]. There are different forms of IIVs available; split vaccines, subunit vaccines, and whole 
virus vaccines. There is also a live-attenuated influenza vaccine. The traditional method for 
producing IAV vaccine strains is growth of the virus in embryonated hen’s eggs. There are 
several factors, such as limited availability and vulnerability of the chicken population to 
potential pandemic strains of IAV, which may limit or complicate the production of egg-grown 
vaccines. Mammalian cell culture systems, insect cells, and plant cells do not have the same 
drawbacks as growing in eggs, but highly productive systems have been more difficult than 
expected to establish and maintain, and thus most vaccines are still egg-based. In Sweden 
annual vaccination is recommended for risk groups [164] e.g. adults ≥65 years, pregnant 
women, and people with certain underlying medical conditions. The composition of influenza 
vaccines change when new or antigenically drifted strains emerge. Since 1977, IIV have 
contained three influenza strains – one A(H1N1), one A(H3N2) and one influenza B. Due to 
recent co-circulation of two distinct lineages of influenza B virus quadrivalent formulations 
have been produced and licensed for use.  
 
The only known correlate of protection for IAV is HI titer. A titer of  ≥40 is considered 50% 
protective. However, it is important to know if vaccine induced immunity can be compared to 
the immunity elicited by natural infection in regards of duration, cross-protection, humoral 
response, and cell-mediated response. Immune memory is considered to have reached a resting 
state a year after the first encounter with IAV. A recent study [165] compared three different 
patient groups. One group received an adjuvanted monovalent A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine, one 
group had been mildly ill with natural IAV infection, and one group had been severely ill. 
Several parameters were measured one year after vaccination/infection. The results confirmed 
that vaccination induced humoral and cellular immune responses similar to those of a mild to 
moderate infection. Patients who had been severely ill had higher hemagglutination inhibition 
(HI) titers in serum, compared to both mildly ill and vaccinated subjects. It is clear that more 
research on the effects of vaccination versus infection is needed.   
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1.5.2 Antivirals 
The use of antivirals against influenza A infection can shorten the duration of disease. 
Antivirals may also be used as prophylactic strategy to limit the spread in an early pandemic 
phase. In the case of a new pandemic, the virus can spread rapidly and updated vaccines may 
not be available in time for a global mass-vaccination. The antivirals commonly used for 
treatment or prevention of IAV disease are described in the sections below. 
 
1.5.2.1 M2 inhibitors 
The M2 protein is a part of the virus envelope, where it functions as a proton channel. During 
the virus entry process, the M2 proton channel is involved in lowering the pH in the virus, 
resulting in the dissociation of M1-vRNP interactions. When the virus membrane fuses with 
the endosomal membrane, the free vRNP is released and transported to the nucleus. There are 
two antivirals that can inhibit M2 [166], amantadine, and rimantadine. When the M2 channel 
is blocked, the release of M1-vRNPs into the cytoplasm and further transport of vRNPs into 
the nucleus is blocked (Figure 6) [167]. These antivirals are not recommended for use due to 
extensive circulation of amantadine-resistant viruses in the human population [168].  
 
1.5.2.2 Neuraminidase inhibitors 
NA is important for promoting release of newly produced virus from infected cells. It prevents 
aggregation of virions, and it also facilitates infection in the respiratory tract by removal of SA 
from mucins and by destroying decoy receptors [53]. There are two antiviral agents commonly 
used to treat influenza A infections: oseltamivir and zanamivir. They inhibit the NA function, 
thereby hindering the release of newly formed virus (Figure 6) [169]. These compounds are 
administered orally and inhaled, respectively. There are reports of oseltamivir resistance [170-
172], but there are only few reports of zanamivir resistance [173,174]. It has been shown that, 
if treatment is started within 48 hours after onset of symptoms, these antivirals can reduce the 
duration of influenza illness with 1-2 days [175].  
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Figure 6. Antivirals and their mechanism of action in the IAV replication cycle. M2 ion-channel 
inhibitors act by blocking vRNP transport into the nucleus. NA inhibitors target the NA, an 
interaction that blocks the release of newly formed progeny virus. HA fusion inhibitors targets 
the HA, more specifically this interaction inhibits the fusion between the viral envelope and 
the endosomal membrane.  
 
1.5.2.3 Hemagglutinin fusion inhibitiors 
A third class of antivirals against IAV targets the fusion activity of the HA (Figure 6). The 
antiviral, Arbidol, has been shown to inhibit the replication of all IAV subtypes and influenza 
B viruses [176,177]. The product is only licensed in Russia and China, and its clinical efficacy 
has not been completely established. 
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1.5.3 Pandemic preparedness 
The WHO has prepared guidelines to aid countries in pandemic preparedness and response 
planning [100]. A pandemic can be divided into 6 phases, 1 through 6, followed by a post-peak 
period, a possible new wave period, and the post-pandemic period. Phase 1-3 are primarily 
aimed at strengthening pandemic preparedness and response, such as developing robust 
surveillance systems in collaboration with other relevant sectors. In phase 4, there is evidence 
of human-to-human transmission and ability to sustain community-level outbreaks. This phase 
emphasizes increased surveillance, and also a first step to limit, or delay, spread by vaccination. 
During phase 5-6, the actions are no longer focused on preparedness but on response. During 
the post-peak period, there is time to prepare for a possible future pandemic wave by restocking 
resources and revising plans. The final post-pandemic phase occurs when levels of influenza 
activity have returned to normal.  
 
In Sweden, three different antivirals (Tamiflu®, Relenza®, and Symmetrel®) are stock-piled 
in case of a pandemic [178]. A pandemic vaccine is impossible to stock-pile, since the vaccine 
cannot be produced until the pandemic IAV strain has been identified.  
 
1.5.3.1 Surveillance in humans 
The aim of IAV surveillance is to identify virus with a possible pandemic potential. In Sweden, 
IAV from clinical samples are collected and characterized during each influenza season. IAV 
A(H1N1) confirmed cases are subject to notification to the Public Health Agency of Sweden, 
which issues weekly influenza reports. There is a sentinel program in Sweden, that reports back 
to WHO and European Center for Disease prevention and Control [179]. Participating health 
care centres submit nasopharyngeal samples from patients with influenza-like illness, and these 
samples are screened for IAV. A subset of positive samples are further characterized by 
sequencing. When a new IAV emerges, it is crucial to establish a polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) that targets the new strain.  
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1.5.3.2 Surveillance in birds 
Surveillance of IAV in birds is an important tool to properly assess potential pandemic threats. 
Much work has been focused on IAV in its natural environment, the aquatic birds. Birds can 
be sampled by taking cloacal swabs, oropharyngeal swabs or serum. IAV is detected by real 
time reverse transcriptase PCR, and isolates can be further characterized by sequencing or HI. 
Sera can also be tested by HI or other serological methods including enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and microneutralization.  
In response to the HPAI H5N1 virus, the European Commission required all member states to 
increase surveillance for avian influenza. If HPAI virus is detected in wild birds or poultry, or 
in case LPAI virus of subtype H5 or H7 is detected in poultry, this must be reported to the 
European Commission and to the World Organisation for Animal Health. The results of the 
entire surveillance must be reported to the European Commission, which presents an annual 
report.  
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2 AIMS OF THE PRESENT STUDIES 
In this thesis, focus lies on gaining further, more detailed knowledge about IAV, as it affects 
animals as well as humans around the world. This thesis helps put a small piece of the puzzle 
together. 
 
Specific aims 
 To investigate if migratory ”hot spots” are places for avian IAV to thrive and to reassort. 
 To investigate if a pseudoparticle neutralization test can be used to detect antibodies 
against H5 and H7 IAV in birds. 
 To investigate possible age-related differences in neutralizing antibody patterns against 
H1N1 IAV before the 2009 pandemic.  
 To study the prevalence of anti-neuraminidase (NA) antibodies in Sweden before the 
2009 pandemic, and study the influence of anti-NA antibodies in a neutralization assay 
with prolonged incubation time. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
There are many different methods used for detection, propagation and characterization of IAV, 
some are old techniques which have been used for decades and some are recently implemented. 
The following methods were used in this thesis. 
 
3.1 SCREENING AND CHARACTERIZATION OF INFLUENZA A VIRUS 
3.1.1 RNA isolation and virus detection 
RNA from fecal samples collected from birds was extracted by using commercially available 
kits. Subsequently, a reverse transcriptase PCR followed by a real time PCR was carried out. 
The primers used for detection targeted a conserved region of the M segment. In paper I, fecal 
samples were screened with two PCR-systems: one SYBR-green system and one TaqMan 
system. 
 
3.1.2 Virus isolation 
There are several ways to isolate influenza virus: either in cell-culture, or in embryonated 
chicken eggs. In this thesis, egg culture was used to isolate and propagate virus.  
All samples that were positive by RT-PCR were inoculated in embryonated chicken eggs. 
Propagation in eggs has been the standard method for IAV since it was introduced in the 
1930’s. The World Organisation for Animal Health guidelines [180] state that this is the 
method of choice for isolation of IAV from birds. Most avian IAVs grow in embryonated eggs 
while many human and some porcine viruses grow poorly. For the latter, isolation of virus from 
cell culture (primarily MDCK) is often used. It should however be kept in mind that growth of 
IAV, both in eggs or cell culture, can induce mutations that may change the virus phenotype. 
In paper I, the original sample was inoculated in 11-days old embryonated chicken eggs. The 
allantoic fluid was harvested after two days and growth of IAV was detected by an HA assay 
with chicken erythrocytes. If no IAV was detected after the first passage, the allantoic fluid 
was passaged once more. Not all PCR-positive samples could be isolated, indicating that 
differences in virus content or degradation in the original sample may determine the outcome 
of an isolation attempt. Another aspect to keep in mind is that if two strains are present in one 
sample there is no guarantee that they both will grow in embryonated chicken eggs.  
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3.1.3  Characterization of influenza A virus 
3.1.3.1 Hemagglutination assay and hemagglutination inhibition assay 
These methods are fast, cheap and reliable tools for confirmation of IAV growth and 
characterization of IAV. The HA inhibition test was first described in the 1940s [181,182]. 
Hemagglutination occurs when virus particles cross-bind SA residues on erythrocytes via the 
receptor-binding site present on the HA, i.e. agglutinated blood cells form a carpet coating the 
bottom of a test tube or microplate-well, while non-agglutinated erythrocytes form a button.  
Pre-incubation with anti-HA antibodies inhibits the binding between HA and SA on 
erythrocytes. A common method to type IAV isolates is to test the virus against a panel of 
subtype specific antisera (rabbit or ferret).  
 
3.1.3.2 Sequencing 
In paper I, PCR products were amplified using specific primers for conserved non-coding 
regions for all gene segments [183], followed by a gel-purification step prior to sequencing.  
 
3.1.3.3 Genomic analysis and phylogenetic trees 
To show the relationship between different subtypes and different strains of IAV (paper I), 
phylogenetic trees were constructed. The Bioedit 7.0.0 software was used for alignments and 
subsequently the Mega3 software [184] was used to construct neighbor joining trees for each 
gene and subtype of the glycoproteins. Representative sequences were selected from each 
major sub-clade to represent the phylogenetic span in a comprehensible way. The Eurasian and 
American sequences were then merged and aligned with full length sequences of our own 
samples. These alignments were used to illustrate phylogenetic and geographic relationships. 
In paper III, HA nucleotide sequences for phylogenetic analysis were downloaded from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/. Alignment was performed using MUSCLE algorithm in MEGA 
5.2.2 [185] and Jmodeltest 2.1.2 [186] was used to evaluate the best phylogenetic model. Then, 
Bayesian evolutionary analysis by sampling trees [187] adding age tips and, resulting from the 
Jmodeltest analysis, the general time-reversible and invariant sites model was used for 
phylogenetic analysis. The maximum clade credibility tree was calculated with TreeAnnotator 
using 10% of the trees as burn-in. The tree was then elaborated and annotated with FigTree 
[188]. 
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3.2 ANTIBODY DETECTION 
The detection of antibodies against IAV is an important tool when it comes to influenza 
surveillance, both human and animal. Here, we describe four methods used for the detection of 
anti-influenza antibodies.  
 
3.2.1 Hemagglutination inhibition 
The HI assay is a very useful technique to evaluate influenza antibody levels in a population. 
The method relies on the hemagglutination of erythrocytes (as described in section 3.1.3.1) and 
the addition of sera that inhibit this interaction. Although HI antibodies are not the same as 
neutralizing antibodies, the serum titers obtained with the HI assay do correlate with protection 
against influenza [189,190]. This approach can also be used to diagnose influenza, if viral 
shedding has ceased and no virus can be identified. The acute phase and convalescent phase 
sera can be tested and if there is an increase in antibody titers, four-fold or higher, the result is 
considered positive. 
 
3.2.2 Microneutralization test 
A neutralization test detects protective antibodies, and is thus useful to study immunity after 
disease or vaccination. It can be carried out in a micro-format, and it does not require any other 
pre-treatment of samples than heat-inactivation of sera. Serum is mixed with virus and 
incubated for 1 hour at 37ºC in 96-well plates before target cells are added. Cells may then be 
monitored daily for cytopathic effect by microscopy, which can be difficult and requires 
training. Another option is to fix the cells and use an antibody towards influenza NP followed 
by a secondary peroxidase labelled antibody. The subsequent addition of an appropriate 
substrate will vizualise the presence of influenza antigen by change of colour in the supernatant. 
If virus has been neutralized no colour change will be observed. It is possible to measure the 
optical density of the colour change which reflects the level of neutralization. 
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3.2.3 Pseudoparticle neutralization test 
One alternative to a standard microneutralization assay is to use pseudotype virus particles. The 
advantages are many: there is no need for live virus, the particles are easy to produce and 
standardize, and the assay is sensitive. The particles are produced in a packaging cell line, 
HEK-293T, by transfection with plasmid constructs which create virus like particles (Figure 
7). One plasmid contains HIV gag/pol, one contains influenza HA and one is a reporter gene 
construct. For some subtypes of influenza, a plasmid expressing a protease is also needed for 
successful cleavage of HA [191]. The NA can be co-transfected if desired. The produced 
particles carry a reporter gene, in this case luciferase, which makes it possible to detect 
infection/inhibited infection. The assay is then performed similarly to a standard 
microneutralization test.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Pseudoparticle neutralization assay. HEK293T cells are transfected with plasmids 
containing IAV HA, HIV gag and pol, a protease to cleave IAV HA into its active form, and a 
luciferase reporter gene for later detection. The produced pseudoparticle carries the IAV HA 
on its surface, and the luciferase reporter gene inside. The produced pseudoparticles are 
subsequently used in neutralization test, where they are mixed with serum. After 48 hours 
incubation on HEK293T cells, an appropriate substrate is added and relative luminescence is 
detected in a luminometer.  
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3.2.4 Enzyme-linked lectin assay 
The surface glycoprotein NA is crucial for the release of newly formed virus particles [46,47]. 
There are commercial methods available for the measurement of NA activity, but only one 
method that can measure neuraminidase inhibiting (NI) antibodies  [192,193]. In paper IV, the 
enzyme-linked lectin assay (ELLA, Figure 8) was used to measure NI antibodies in human 
sera.  The method relies on the use of reassortant IAV, i.e. non-human HA, to avoid interference 
by HA-specific antibodies. A serum-virus mixture is added to plates coated with fetuin. If no 
antibodies targeting NA are present in the serum, the NA will cleave terminal residues of the 
fetuin, exposing sites where HRP-conjugated peanut-agglutinin (PNA-HRP), can bind. The 
bound PNA-HRP can be detected by adding an appropriate substrate and measuring the optical 
density.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Enzyme-linked lectin assay. Serum and IAV is added to a fetuin coated plate and 
incubated. PNA-HRP is added to the plate, and if the NA is inhibited the PNA-HRP is not able 
to bind to the fetuin (= no signal). If the NA is not inhibited, terminal residues on fetuin is 
cleaved thereby exposing binding sites for PNA (=signal).  
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4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In the sections below, the results from papers I-IV will be discussed. 
 
4.1 PAPER I 
The aim in paper I was to study the presence and characteristics of avian IAV in wild birds 
in Alaska. The proximity of two continents and major migratory flyways that intersect here 
could be an ideal geographic area for IAV from Eurasian lineages and North American 
lineages to mix. Dabbling ducks, geese, shorebirds, and gulls were sampled from the Chukchi 
Peninsula and Point Barrow. Substantial effort was made to ensure proper handling of the 
collected samples. The material was treated and stored in -80°C within six hours after being 
collected.  
 
Our results show similar prevalences (2%) of IAV in avian species from this area, as 
compared to other parts of the world [72]. Four samples from Point Barrow, Alaska, were 
positive by PCR, and three of them could be isolated in embryonated chicken eggs. 
Phylogenetical analysis revealed three distinct subtypes: H6N1 (from a dunlin), H8N4 (from 
two northern pintails), and H3N8 (from a northern pintail). The analysis of all gene segments 
showed that the H6 was of Asian lineage origin. All other gene segments were from the 
American lineage. However, when compared to all Asian and American H6 genes the closest 
match was an American isolate from Delaware. This finding suggest that the isolated Asian 
origin H6 virus was an already established introduction in North America. No completely 
Eurasian viruses have been found in North America [194,195], but chimeric IAV have been 
found [194,196-198], although they are considered to be the result of rare events of 
reassortment.  
 
Relevant bird species (e.g. northern pintails) have common Holarctic breeding grounds, and 
birds banded in Alaska have been recovered in Eurasia. Thus, this is a species that makes 
trans-hemispheric movements [198]. The possibility of genetic exchange between Eurasian 
and North American virus lineages is a potential threat, although these events are relatively 
rare [194,196-198]. In our study, one gene segment was of Asian origin, but the closest match 
was a virus isolate from North America, retrieved before the current expedition. This 
indicates that mixing of lineages does occur. Humans may occasionally be infected by avian 
IAV, including the recent H7N9 human cases [199]. There is a need for better understanding 
of the dynamics of genetic reassortment and the barrier that it might constitute, and  relate it 
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to bird migration and breeding habitats. Threats of highly pathogenic avian IAV spread via 
migratory birds should be properly assessed, in order to undertake appropriate measures in 
the face of a new pandemic. 
 
4.2 PAPER II 
In surveillance programs, birds are primarily screened for the presence of IAV genetic material 
but it may also be valuable to detect antibodies against IAV, which reflect previous IAV 
infections. Methods such as HI and ELISA are available and used for this purpose. In paper II, 
we compared a pseudoparticle neutralization test (pp-NT) (based on HPAI H5 and H7 strains) 
with standard tests such as microneutralization and HI. The pseudotype particles were produced 
by transfecting cells with plasmids, encoding MLV gag/pol, and IAV HA, respectively, and a 
luciferase reporter gene construct. The resulting particles carry the IAV HA on the surface, and 
the reporter gene on the inside. In this paper, we also aimed to investigate the possibilities to 
use the pp-NT to screen sera from a variety of avian species. The titers observed with the pp-
NT were comparable to those observed with microneutralization test and HI. Moreover, when 
a panel of avian sera was tested, the pp-NT could identify sera containing antibodies against 
subtypes H5 and H7. However, two of the H7N3 sera were negative when tested with the H7 
pp-NT, and whether this was due to low titers in these field-samples, or too large differences 
in the HA, remains unclear.  
 
IAV can infect many different species [70] and IAV from the natural reservoir (i.e. birds) pose 
a threat to human health [1,104,105]. HPAI virus of subtypes H5 and H7 are the causative 
agents of fowl plague in poultry [200], and since 1997 there have been reports of human cases 
of HPAI H5N1 virus infections [201]. HPAI H7 virus has also been reported in humans, 
causing conjunctivitis and/or influenza-like illness [104]. Surveillance of IAV in poultry and 
wild birds is a key factor when it comes to prediction and control of a pandemic. A surveillance 
study conducted in China [202] in live poultry markets showed that H7N9 was prevalent in 
samples from the birds as well as in environmental samples from cage floors, drinking water, 
and slaughter zones. Workers from these poultry markets were also tested. One asymptomatic 
H7N9 infection was detected by RT-PCR. Additionally, there was serological evidence of 
H7N9 exposure in 1,6 % of the workers when sera were tested by HI. Thus, a serological 
method such as the pp-NT, that measures neutralizing antibodies in a safe way, could be an 
option in both bird and human surveillance studies instead of traditional methods that rely on 
the use of live virus. We believe that surveillance of birds is absolutely necessary to catch early 
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emergence of HPAI virus strains, or IAV of subtypes that might evolve to HPAI virus (e.g. H5, 
and H7). Serological methods may be of great value to further increase the possibility to detect 
such subtypes. 
  
4.3 PAPER III 
The 2009 pandemic was caused by a novel A(H1N1) strain. Initial reports suggested that 
previously circulating strains and vaccines were ineffective. Usually, the elderly (>65 years of 
age) are considered a risk group for serious influenza illness, but this particular group was not 
affected as anticipated. The elderly were shown to have pre-existing, cross-reactive antibodies, 
which could have protected them from infection [149,150]. However, serological analyses by 
HI in Sweden did not identify significantly higher cross-reactive antibody titers in the elderly 
compared to other age groups [102].  
From that set of samples collected before the pandemic, 99 samples were randomly chosen, 
stratified in ten-year age intervals, and tested for neutralizing antibodies against HA from four 
A(H1N1) strains. The HAs used were derived from A/South Carolina/1/1918, A/Puerto 
Rico/8/1934, A/New Caledonia/20/1999, and A/Brisbane/59/2007, respectively. The assay 
was based on pseudovirus particles, with a core of HIV gag/pol, IAV HA on the surface, and a 
reporter gene expressing luciferase. Our results show that only one age group, the >90 year-
olds, had significantly higher neutralizing titers against A/South Carolina/1/1918. This age 
group had a median neutralizing titer of 320. The 71-80 and the 81-90 year-olds had 
significantly higher neutralizing titers against A/Puerto Rico/8/1934. The median titers in these 
two age groups were 3840 and 3200, respectively. There were no significant differences in 
neutralizing titers between the age groups when A/New Caledonia/20/1999 and 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 were tested.  All samples were positive, with median titers >320. The 
hypothesis in this study was that the elderly would have dominating cross-reactive neutralizing 
antibodies towards strains that circulated during their childhood.  
A first IAV infection is thought to prime and affect later antibody responses; a phenomenon 
referred to as the theory of “original antigenic sin” [203]. It is believed that original antigenic 
sin could have been a reason for the unusal mortality pattern observed during the Spanish flu 
pandemic in 1918 (caused by A/South Carolina/1/1918-like IAV). During that pandemic, the 
elderly fared relatively well, while young adults were severely affected [204]. 
Seroarcheological research suggests that the IAV strain that circulated during the childhood of 
these young adults was of a different subtype i.e. H3 [87]. The elderly, however were likely to 
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have been exposed to H1N1 during their childhood, which would have granted them protection 
against the Spanish Flu. The A/South Carolina/1/1918 strain is phylogenetically closely related 
to the 2009 pandemic virus A(H1N1)pdm09, and several studies show a cross protection 
against the two strains [205-208]. Moreover, antibodies against the A/Puerto Rico/8/1934 strain 
have also been shown to protect against challenge with A(H1N1)pdm09 in mice [209].  
 
4.4 PAPER IV 
In paper IV, serum samples collected before the 2009 pandemic were tested for the presence 
of antibodies against NA. Ninety-nine samples, the same as used in study III, stratified in 10-
year age intervals were analyzed by an ELLA and also by a neutralization test. It is believed 
that anti-NA antibodies are important for mitigating influenza disease [153-155], and we 
hypothesized that the presence of cross-reactive anti-NA antibodies against the 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus could explain why the elderly were so mildly affected by the 
pandemic. ELLA measures neuraminidase inhibiting (NI) antibodies, i.e. antibodies that 
inhibit the function of the NA. A neutralization test mainly measures neutralizing antibodies 
against HA, but it is believed that a prolonged incubation time (up to a week) of the 
neutralization test can show effects of antibodies targeting other viral proteins, such as NA.  
 
A comparison of ELLA and neutralization test with prolonged incubation time (6 days) were 
used to evaluate the NI antibody response. We also determined if NI antibody titers were 
correlated to age. The results showed a strong positive correlation between NI antibodies, as 
measured by ELLA, and age (r=0.67, p=<0.0001). The correlation between neutralization 
and NI titers was however weak and thus a neutralization assay with increased incubation 
time is not a feasible method to measure NI antibodies. It has been shown that repeated 
exposure to NA can induce a robust NI antibody response [156]. It is possible that the high 
titres of NI antibodies found in the elderly, in combination with pre-existing cross-reactive 
antibodies to HA, contributed to the protection of the elderly during the 2009 pandemic. The 
NA content is, in contrast to HA, not measured in influenza vaccines. If it is of importance 
for protection, at least against severe disease, NA should be given more focus in vaccine 
production. The role of antibodies targeting NA needs to be further evaluated. ELLA was in 
our hands a robust and practical method to measure NI antibodies, and the method could be 
extremely helpful in larger studies, evaluating the humoral NA response to various IAV 
strains. 
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Influenza epidemics occur every year in all countries across the globe. Influenza viruses infect 
not only humans, but also animals. The work presented within this thesis aim to increase the 
knowledge of possible IAV spread, between continents, by wild birds. We have also evaluated 
and implemented a pp-NT for detection of IAV neutralizing antibodies in both avian and 
human sera. In addition we evaluated a method for detection of NI antibodies. The titers 
obtained with the pp-NT and ELLA showed that the elderly in 2009 had higher antibody titers 
to A(H1N1) strains circulating in 1918 and 1934, and we also found a positive correlation 
between age and NI antibody titers. These findings may help explain why the elderly were 
relatively spared during the 2009 pandemic. 
 
Birds are the natural reservoir for IAV and it is of utmost importance to know what types of 
viruses that circulates among them since virus from this reservoir can spread to humans. In 
paper I, we investigated if viruses of different genetic lineages (e.g. Eurasian and American) 
mixed at migratory hot spots, such as Point Barrow in Alaska. Even though we did not find any 
evidence of recent genetic mixing at this migratory hot spot, the risk of viruses being able to 
spread by migrating birds could still be a concern.  
 
One way to monitor which viruses are present within this reservoir, besides regularly testing 
domestic and wild birds for the presence of IAV, is screening for antibodies directed against 
IAV. There is also a need to monitor humans for the presence of antibodies against avian IAV, 
since workers at poultry markets and farms have close contact with living and dead poultry. In 
paper II, we evaluated a pp-NT which was found as sensitive as using the conventional methods 
microneutralization test and HI assay. When a panel of avian sera was tested, the pp-NT could 
detect HA subtypes H5 and H7. The pp-NT is based on non-infectious pseudovirus particles 
and is therefore a safe alternative to other antibody detection assays that are based on live virus.  
 
In humans, IAV cause epidemics every year, and the elderly is considered a risk group. The 
reason why elderly were only mildly affected by the 2009 pandemic virus is not clear. In paper 
III, we showed that of all age groups, the >90 year olds had the highest neutralizing titers 
against the 1918 Spanish flu virus, which is phylogenetically related to the 2009 pandemic 
virus. In addition, we observed high neutralizing titers against IAV circulating in 1934 in 71-
90 year olds. In animal studies, antibodies against this virus has also been shown to offer some 
protection against the 2009 virus. Our results support the theory that the elderly were protected 
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during the 2009 pandemic by immune responses induced early in life by IAVs antigenically 
similar to the 2009 pandemic virus.  
 
In paper IV, we observed a strong correlation between NI antibodies and age. We also 
investigated if a neutralization test with prolonged incubation time could be an option to 
measure NI antibodies. Our results do not suggest that such a neutralization test is an alternative 
to measure NI antibodies. Since IAV vaccines were introduced in the 1940s, the focus has been 
on the HA part of the virus. However, the mitigating effect of NI antibodies should be 
considered when vaccines are produced. There is an interest in developing universal IAV 
vaccines that target the stalk of the HA [210,211], but there could also be of interest to develop 
vaccines that do not prevent infection but instead lead to a milder disease. However, more 
research is needed before vaccines that induce broadly neutralizing antibodies targeting the HA 
stalk and antibodies targeting the NA become a reality.  
    
  
  47 
6 POPULÄRVETENSKAPLIG SAMMANFATTNING 
Influensa orsakas av ett virus och drabbar varje år många människor över hela världen. De 
vanligaste symtomen är plötsligt insjuknande, feber och ont i kroppen. De allra flesta blir friska 
inom några veckor, men det finns ett antal riskgrupper där influensa kan orsaka svår sjukdom.  
När en människa infekteras med influensavirus reagerar kroppen med att aktivera 
immunförsvaret. Antikroppar bildas, vilket hjälper till att döda viruset. När man blir infekterad 
av samma virus igen kan kroppen snabbt producera dessa specifika antikroppar och därigenom 
skydda mot infektion eller svår sjukdom. Antikropparna kan påvisas genom att testa serum i 
ett så kallat neutralisationstest. Det finns två ytproteiner på influensaviruset, hemagglutinin och 
neuraminidas, och vid infektion bildas antikroppar mot båda dessa ytproteiner.  
 
Sedan många år tillbaka är det känt att influensavirus från fåglar kan orsaka sjukdom hos 
människan. Hittills har det handlat om enskilda fall utan vidare spridning mellan människor. 
Dock finns det en risk att fågelvirus ska smitta människor och börja spridas mellan människor. 
Därför är det viktigt att ha en god övervakning över vilka virus som sprids, både i människa 
och i djur. I delarbete II använde vi en neutralisationsmetod för att testa om vi kunde identifiera 
antikroppar riktade mot de subtyper (H5 och H7) av influensavirus som orsakat svåra utbrott i 
fågel och även infekterat människor. Vi jämförde denna metod med andra metoder som använts 
länge för detta ändamål, samt testade om metoden kunde användas för att specifikt detektera 
antikroppar mot H5 och H7 i serum från olika fåglar. Resultatet visade att metoden var 
jämförbar med andra metoder, samt att den specifikt kunde detektera H5 och H7 subtyper av 
influensavirus. Det finns en oro att vilda fåglar ska sprida dessa allvarliga subtyper av 
influensavirus till olika delar i världen, något som teoretiskt kan ske i och med att många 
fågelarter förflyttar sig långa sträckor och då kommer i kontakt med andra fåglar som kan bära 
smittan vidare till andra delar av världen. Ett sådant ställe finns i Alaska, där flera olika 
flygvägar för flyttfåglar korsar varandra. I delarbete I ville vi undersöka om vi kunde se tecken 
på att influensavirus från olika världsdelar blandas till nya varianter. Prover togs från fåglar i 
Alaska, och det genetiska materialet från de virus som hittades analyserades. Resultaten visade 
inga spår av att influensavirus från olika kontinenter nyligen blandats och gett upphov till nya 
genetiska varianter.  
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Under 1900-talet har influensa orsakat flera pandemier. Den mest kända är den så kallade 
spanska sjukan, som 1918 dödade upp till 50 miljoner människor. År 2009 inträffade den första 
pandemin detta århundrade. Den drabbade främst yngre människor, och inte de äldre vilka 
vanligtvis är en riskgrupp för influensa. I den här avhandlingen handlar två arbeten om hur vi 
identifierat skillnader i antikroppsnivåer mellan olika åldersgrupper. Viruset som orsakade 
spanska sjukan är likt det virus som gav upphov till pandemin 2009 och man tror att människor 
som är födda runt 1918 kan ha varit skyddade mot viruset 2009. Eftersom de redan hade 
antikroppar mot det virusets hemagglutinin, kunde infektion förhindras. I delarbete III visar vi 
att personer äldre än 90 år i större utsträckning hade antikroppar mot spanska sjukan-viruset än 
de yngre, något som kan ha skyddat dem mot pandemiviruset 2009. Vi visar även att människor 
födda runt 1934 hade antikroppar mot ett influensavirus som cirkulerade då, vilket även det är 
ganska likt viruset som orsakade pandemin 2009. I delarbete IV tittar vi på antikroppar mot det 
andra ytproteinet, neuraminidas. Vi ser även där att äldre hade antikroppar mot neuraminidas i 
större utsträckning än de yngre. Det är alltså möjligt att dessa befintliga antikroppar bidrog till 
att de äldre inte drabbades så hårt år 2009.  
 
Den här avhandlingen har bidragit till att öka kunskapen kring eventuella genetiska utbyten 
mellan fåglar i Alaska, samt huruvida det finns säkra metoder för att detektera antikroppar mot 
H5 och H7 influensavirus i serum från fåglar, utan användning av levande influensavirus. 
Vidare har den ökat förståelsen för hur tidigare influensainfektioner i människa kan påverka 
senare infektioner, i och med att befintliga antikroppar mot både hemagglutinin och 
neuraminidas kan skydda mot infektion och svår sjukdom.      
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